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W hy Comply?
A n A nalysis of T rends in Compliance
with Judgments of the International
Court of Justice since Nicaragua
Heather L. Jones
³0RUHWKDQHYHUEHIRUHLQKXPDQKLVWRU\ZHVKDUHD
common destiny. We can master it only if-we face it
together. And that, my friends, is why we have the United
1DWLRQV´
² Kofi Annan
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W hy Comply?
A n A nalysis of T rends in Compliance
with Judgments of the International
Court of Justice since Nicaragua
Heather L. Jones
Introduction
Since Nicaragua ,1 WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUWRI-XVWLFH ³,&-´ KDVZLWQHVVHG
substantial compliance with its judgments. As will be discussed in Section
II, outright defiance has not been asserted in any case; rather, in cases
where total compliance was not achieved, the noncompliance was slight.
The following four factors, discussed in Section III, contribute to such
compliance: external political influence, the internal need for a definitive
solution, the substance of the judgment issued, and internal political
LQIOXHQFH  6HFWLRQ ,9 RIIHUV D FXPXODWLYH DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH IDFWRUV¶
influence on compliance in four categories of cases: territorial disputes
over sovereignty, territorial disputes over boundary lines, criminal
procedure issues, and disputes over interpretation. Lastly, Section V offers
suggestions for continuing compliance trends.
Because many scholars have labeled Nicaragua DV WKH ³WXUQLQJ
SRLQW´LQD³VHULHVRILQVWDQFHVRIRSHQGHILDQFHDQGQRQ-DSSHDUDQFH´2 this
assessment considers only those cases that were adjudicated subsequent to
that decision. The aggregation of cases arbitrated from 1986 to the present3
ZLOOEHUHIHUUHGWRKHUHLQDV³PRGHUQHUD´GLVSXWHV7KLVSDSHUHYDOXDWHV
only contentious cases in which the ICJ ordered a judgment on the merits.4
Neither advisory proceedings nor provisional measures were considered.
                                                                                                                      
1

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June
27).
2
Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of
Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT¶L L. 815, 825 (2008) (quoting CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH
DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 403 (Philippe Sands et al. eds., Oxford
University Press 2004)).
3
This article was completed in December 2010.
4
See Appendix A for a list of included cases.
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This paper excludes twelve post-Nicaragua cases that have not yet
procured a judgment on the merits, as well as four cases where compliance
with the judgments cannot yet be determined.5 Four additional cases that
were discontinued without any prior judgment on the merits were likewise
GLVUHJDUGHGDVZHUHWZRFDVHVWKDWZHUHUHPRYHGIURPWKH&RXUW¶VOLVWDW
the joint request of the parties.6 Further, eighteen cases were excluded in
which the claim was rejected on jurisdictional or admissibility grounds, or
where there was no positive statement that could possibly imply a duty of
acceptance and implementation.7
I.

'HILQLQJ³&RPSOLDQFH´

This assessment GHILQHV ³FRPSOLDQFH´ LQ WHUPV RI GHILDQFH
³'HILDQFH´ UHIHUV WR the ³ZKROHVDOH UHMHFWLRQ RI D MXGJPHQW DV LQYDOLG
FRXSOHGZLWKDUHIXVDOWRFRPSO\´8 In the modern era, there have been no
cases of outright defiance where a respective respondent has deliberately,
RSHQO\DQGFRQWLQXRXVO\WDNHQDFWLRQFRQWUDU\WRDMXGJPHQW³YHKHPHQWO\
FULWLFL]LQJ WKH &RXUW DQG FKDOOHQJLQJ WKH ELQGLQJQHVV RI LWV GHFLVLRQ>@´9
Noncompliance, in the sense used here, requires more than initial
disapproval; it requires a complete, unceasing refutation of the judgment
from which the defiant party has not recanted.
Although no state has been directly noncompliant of a modern era
MXGJPHQW VRPH GHFLVLRQV ³KDYH PHW ZLWK OHVV FRPSOLDQFH WKDQ RWKHUV´10
Initial noncompliant behavior has been observed following a judgment in
FDVHVZKHUHDSDUW\LVGLVVDWLVILHGZLWKWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQDQGXQZLOOLQJ
to accept it at the outset; but such instances are not cases of direct
noncompliance because the refusal to comply eventually subsides.11 Cases
of slight noncompliance exist where a party claims to comply with a
decision, but does not take action to match its verbal commitment. 12 Such
behavior is likewise not directly noncompliant because there is no outward
rejection of the decision.
In some cases, implementation problems subsist that render parties
XQDEOHWRVXIILFLHQWO\FRPSO\ZLWKWKH&RXUW¶VMXGJPHQWGHVSLWH bona fide
                                                                                                                      
See Appendix B for a list of cases excluded from consideration.
See id.
See id.
8
Llamzon, supra note 2, at 823.
9
CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 272
(Philippe Sands et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2004).
10
Id. at 436.
11
See, e.g., Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, at 18-19, 28 (Feb. 3); Land and Maritime
Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), 2002 I.C.J. 303, at 6-7, 23 (Oct. 10),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/94/7453.pdf.
12
Id.
5
6
7
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efforts to do so. In these instances, failure to comply does not constitute
noncompliance because it is a result of an inability to implement the
decision rather than of defiant behavior by either party.
I I.

F actors Affecting Compliance

Four factors determine the extent to which compliance will be
achieved: external political influence, internal need for a definitive
solution, the substance of the judgment issued, and internal political
influence. External political influence, such as pressure from the
international community, involvement in international organizations, and
reputation costs associated with defiant behavior, fosters compliance with
ICJ judgments. A second indicator of compliance is the presence of a
genuine need for a definitive solution. Whether such a need exists depends
SULPDULO\ RQ WKH SDUWLHV¶ LQWHUHVWV DQG WKHLU UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK HDFK RWKHU
The last two indicators of compliance discussed, and the factors that incite
the most problems for implementation, are the substance of the judgment
issued and internal political influence. Ambiguity in a judgment acts as a
barrier to implementation, but as a result of inability rather than of bad
faith. A judgment that is in direct conflict with the self-interest of one or
more parties may also be met with resistance, but states tend to comply
nonetheless out of deference to the international regime. An exception to
this trend may arise where a judgment requires a state to take action that is
contrary to domestic policy. The extent to which such internal pressure
will impede compliance and implementation depends on the merits of the
judgment issued.

A.

External Political Influence

External political influence is the extrinsic factor attributable to
VWDWHV¶ GHIHUHQFH WR WKH ,&-  3UHVVXUH IURP WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\
and the presence of international organizations contribute significantly to
ensurinJ VWDWHV¶ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK ,&- MXGJPHQWV  )XUWKHU WKH UHSXWDWLRQ
costs associated with noncompliance, which often result from international
affiliations, minimize the risk of defiant behavior.
1.

Pressure from the International Community

Pressure from the international community is a significant factor in
ensuring compliance with ICJ decisions. International pressure, especially
in the modern era of cases, plays a momentous role in the tendency of
states to seek resolution of disputes in the ICJ and in ensuring compliance
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once judgments are issued. Pressure from the international community is
such that, even in instances where a party fails to submit fully to the
&RXUW¶V MXGJPHQW WKH SDUW\ ZLOO RXWZDUGO\ DWWHVW WR EH GRLQJ VR  7KH
emergence of the international community as a prominent and reputable
body in the modern era of the ICJ has acted as a penal force, furnishing
consequences for states that fail to comply with WKH&RXUW¶VRUGHUV
3UHVVXUHWRFRPSO\FDQEHJHQHUDORUVSHFLILF$VWDWH¶VGHVLre for
membership within the international community generates pressure to act
FRPSOLDQW  )ROORZLQJ WKH ,&-¶V MXGJPHQW LQ WKH .DVLNLOL6HGXGX ,VODQG
FDVHIRUH[DPSOHWKH1DPLELDQSUHVLGHQWVWDWHG³$VDODZ-abiding nation
and consistent with our undertaking, I wish to ensure the international
community that Namibia will abide by the verdict of the ICJ and respect it
IXOO\´13 Such a statement depicts the propensity that many states have to
preserve their effigy in international relations. In some cases, especially
those where noncompliance is suggested or anticipated, the pressure on the
VWDWH WR FRPSO\ LV PRUH VSHFLILF  )RU H[DPSOH IROORZLQJ 1LJHULD¶V
GLVDSSURYDO RI WKH &RXUW¶V MXGJPHQW LQ WKH ODQG DQG PDULWLPH ERXQGDU\
dispute between itself and Cameroon,14 the United States, France, and the
United Kingdom subjected Nigeria to substantial diplomatic pressure to
ensure compliance with the decision.15
Observation of ICJ judgments as a result of international pressure
is further exemplified in matters like the dispute between Libya and Chad
regarding the Aouzou Strip,16 a case that resulted in initial noncompliance.
'HVSLWHRSHQO\FULWLFL]LQJWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ/LE\DKDGIHZRSWLRQVEXW
to comply, as it could no longer stake a claim to the territory without
risking regional and international consequences. Subsequent acceptance of
the judgment as legally binding secured peace between Libya and Chad
after years of feuding; it affirmatively prevented Libya from claiming
sovereignty over the disputed region.17 Some scholars have posited that
/LE\D¶V DUJXDEO\ GXELRXV FRPSOLDQFH VWHPV IURP D ODFN RI SUDLVH E\ WKH
international community for Libya as a law-abider in the wake of the
judgment.18 Such an assertion further evidences the momentous influence
the international community has on ensuring compliance.
5HYLHZRIWKH,&-¶VUHFRUGOLNHZLVHGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
V\VWHP¶V LQIOXHQFH LQ FDXVLQJ VWDWHVWRUHO\ RQWKH &RXUW¶VSURFHGXUHDVD
                                                                                                                      

Christof Maletsky, Kasikili K O , THE NAMBIAN (Dec. 14, 1999), available at
http://allafrica.com/stories/199912140122.html.
14
Cameroon v. Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303.
15
Llamzon, supra note 2, at 836.
16
Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3).
17
Llamzon, supra note 2, at 832.
18
Colter Paulson, Compliance with Judgments of the International Court of Justice since 1987 , 98 AM.
J. INT¶L L. 434, 443 (2004).
13
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valid and necessary means for resolving disputes. A dispute submitted to
the Court by Hungary and Slovakia is illustrative.19 The case revolved
DURXQGWKH *DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros Project, a project solidified by a treaty
between the two states.20 Hungary abandoned the project;21 but even so,
the implications of the international treaty prompted Hungary to first
submit the dispute to the ICJ, rather than baldly defy its obligations under
the agreement.22 Such an act affirms the influence that the international
community and the presence of international agreements can have on
settling disputes between states.
2.

Presence of International Organizations

Article 94(1) of the United Nations Charter articulates member
VWDWHV¶ REOLJDWLRQ WR FRPSO\ ZLWK ,&- GHFLVLRQV H[SUHVVO\ VWDWLQJ WKDW
³>H@DFK PHPEHU RI WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV XQGHrtakes to comply with the
GHFLVLRQVRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUWLQDQ\FDVHWRZKLFKLWLVDSDUW\´23
The importance of active involvement in international
organizations as a means for ensuring compliance with ICJ decisions is
perhaps best shown in the previously mentioned case involving the Bakassi
Peninsula.24 ,QWKDWFDVH1LJHULDHYHQWXDOO\DJUHHGWRDELGHE\WKH&RXUW¶V
decision to award the disputed territory to Cameroon, despite initially
rejecting it, largely due to the active efforts of United Nations.25 Following
1LJHULD¶V RSHQ GLVDSSURYDO RI WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO
community exerted substantial pressure on Nigeria to comply, with the
%ULWLVK+LJK&RPPLVVLRQRIWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPVWDWLQJWR1LJHULD³>,&-@
judgments are binding and not subject to appeal. Nigeria has an obligation
XQGHUWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVFKDUWHUWRFRPSO\ZLWKWKHMXGJPHQW´26 Through
intensive mediation efforts,27 ³WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV SOD\HG D SLYRWDO UROHLQ
WKH µHDVLQJ RI WHQVLRQV DQG UHQHZLQJ FRUGLDOLW\ EHWZHHQ &DPeroon and
                                                                                                                      
19

*DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
Id. ¶¶ 15-22.
Id.
22
Special Agreement for Submission to the International Court of Justice of the Differences Between
7KHP&RQFHUQLQJWKH*DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 7 Apr. 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1293
(1993).
23
U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 1.
24
See Cameroon v. Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10).
25
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Paul R. Hensel, International Institutions and Compliance with
Agreements, 51 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 721, 725 (October 2007).
26
Paulson, supra note 18, at n. 203 (citing Agence F rance-Presse, Doc. FBIS-AFR-2002-1025 (25 Oct.
2002)).
27
Press Release, U.N. AFR/1397 (Cameroon), Nigeria Sign Agreement Ending Decades-Old Border
Dispute (June 12, 2006).
20
21
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1LJHULD¶´28 At the request of both states, the United Nations set up a
FRPPLVVLRQWR³FRQVLGHUWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKHYHUGLFWSURWHFWWKHULJKWV
RIWKHSHRSOHLQWKHDIIHFWHGDUHDVDQGSURSRVHDZRUNDEOHVROXWLRQ´29
Likewise, in the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras over
their land frontier, the legal status of maritime spaces, and sovereignty over
certain islands,30 HDFKVWDWHDIILUPHGLWVDFFHSWDQFHRIWKH&RXUW¶VMXGJPHQW
following the decision and announced its intention to accept and comply
with its obligations under Article 94(1).31 Even when accusations of
defiance arose,32 ERWK VWDWHV FRQWLQXHG WR DYRZ DFFHSWDQFH RI WKH &RXUW¶V
judgment and worked with international organizations to ensure that they
achieved satisfactory compliance.33
In some cases, the presence of international organizations allows
for the resolution of a dispute without a judgment. For example, in the case
regarding the binding nature of an arbitral award on the maritime
boundaries of Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, a final judgment on the
delimitation of the maritime zone in question was never necessary because
the parties reached a compromise.34 An international agency for joint
H[SORLWDWLRQRIWKHGLVSXWHGDUHD¶VUHVRXUFHVZDVHVWDEOLVKHGWRDVVLVWLQWKH
implementaWLRQ RIWKHVWDWHV¶DJUHHPHQW DQGWR RIIHU DLG LQ WKH HYHQWWKDW
the cooperation was to break down.35
Aside from the significance of international organizations in
forging compliance with decisions, their presence, like pressure from the
international community, is also a significant moving force in validating
the legitimacy of such organizations and codifying the authority of the ICJ
to arbitrate international disputes. The LaGrand36 and Avena37 cases,
                                                                                                                      

Kolade Larewaju, UN Panel on Bakassi Meets Dec. 1, VANGUARD (LAGOS), Nov. 29, 2002,
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/2002111290035.html.
29
Shakirat Abdulmajeed, Bakassi Committee to Demarcate Border Set Up , DAILYTRUST (AUJA), Dec.
4, 2002, available at http://www.allafrica.com.
30
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sep. 11).
31
Joint Communique of the Presidents of El Salvador and Honduras of 11 September 1992, 38
.HHVLQJ¶V5HFRUGRI:RUOG(YHQWV$G*  
32
/HWWHUGDWHG-DQIURPWKH&KDUJH¶G¶$IIDLUHVDGLQWHULPRIWKH3HUPDQHQWPLVVLRQRI
Honduras to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1142 (Dec. 1,
2002).
33
Id.; see also Nikki Tait, El Salvador F alls to Quash Border Ruling, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 19,
2003, at 11.
34
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12).
35
Protocol of agreement relating to the organization and operation of the agency for management and
cooperation between the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the Republic of Senegal instituted by the
Agreement of 14 October 1993, U.N. LOS BULL., No. 31, 42-58 (1996) (the parties undertook to
establish this agency in Article 4 of the 1993 agreement).
36
LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 4 Judgment (June 27), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/104/7736.pdf.
37
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 12 Judgment (Feb. 3), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8188.pdf.
28
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FRQFHUQLQJ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶ DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH 9LHQQa Convention on
Consular Relations,38 provide examples. Both disputes were initiated and
VXEPLWWHGWRWKH,&-WKURXJKWKH9LHQQD&RQYHQWLRQ¶V2SWLRQDO3URWRFRORQ
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which the parties ratified39 as a result
of membership in the United Nations. Likewise, the recognition of an
international tribunal like the ICJ can foster compliance in and of itself, as
seen in the Sipadan-Ligitan Case.40 Following an award of the disputed
islands to Malaysia, the Indonesian Embassy announced that it would
honor the obligation created by its submission to the Court and accept the
decision as final and binding.41
The role of international organizations is brought full circle by
considering cases like the dispute between Congo and Belgium over the
legality of an arrest warrant issued by Belgium against a foreign minister of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.42 Because the dispute was
premised on alleged crimes against humanity and breaches of the 1949
Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols I and II,43
Member State status accounted for the submission of the dispute to the ICJ.
*URXQGHGDVDYLRODWLRQRIWKDWSURWRFROWKH,&-¶VGHFLVLRQWRYDOLGDWHWKH
international warrant in question was interpreted in light of elucidations
emplo\HG E\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQV  7KH &RXUW¶V UHDVRQLQJ LQ DGMXGLFDWLQJ
WKHZDUUDQW¶VYDOLGLW\ZDVEDVHGSULPDULO\RQFXVWRPDU\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ
as established by the international community and sustained by
international organizations.44
The case also illustrates how the presence of and pressure from
LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQV FRQWULEXWHV WR DFWLYH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKH &RXUW¶V
MXGJPHQWV RQFH RUGHUHG  %HOJLXP DFFHSWHG WKH &RXUW¶V UXOLQJ ZLWKGUHZ
the warrant, and made the required notifications on the day after the Court
GHOLYHUHG LWV GHFLVLRQ LQWHUSUHWLQJ %HOJLXP¶V REOLJDWLRQV XQGHU WKH
international organization of which it is a part.45 Further, in 1993, Belgium
                                                                                                                      
38

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
Harry S. Clark, III, Note, Determining the Remedy for Violations of Article 36 of the VCCR: Review
and Reconsideration of the Clemency Process After Avena , 38 GEO. WASH. INT¶L L. REV. 131, 149
(2006).
40
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/ Malaysia), 2002 I.C.J. 625 Judgment
(Dec. 17), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/102/7714.pdf.
41
Press Release, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Republic of Indonesia, Following the Decision by
the International Court of Justice on the Sipadan-Ligitan Case, (Dec. 17, 2002), available at
http://home.xtra.co.nz/hosts/indonesianembassy/PressRelease737-04-xii-2002.htm.
42
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 Judgment (Feb. 14),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf.
43
Leen De Smet & Frederik Naert, Making or Breaking International Law? An International Law
$QDO\VLVRI%HOJLXP¶V$FW&RQFHUQLQJWKH3XQLVKPHQWRI*UDYH%UHDFKHVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Humanitarian Law, 35 REVUE BELGE DE DRIOT INTERNATIONAL 471, 491 (2002).
44
See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 42, ¶¶ 51-58.
45
SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 269.
39
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made fundamental changes to its laws on universal jurisdiction,46
complying with its obligations under Article 94(1) and acting in conformity
ZLWKWKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJ47 7KH,&-¶VOHJLWLPDF\ZRXOGEHFRPSURPLVHG
absent the coercive power of the international regime as a means for
ensuring that judgments are executed.
3.

Reputation Costs

Reputation costs promote compliance in a manner similar to
international community pressure and the presence of international
organizations. When states resolve contentious issues with the assistance
of international institutions, they are more likely to comply with
agUHHPHQWV DQG RUGHUV GXH WR ³FRQVLGHUDWLRQ IRUWKHLU UHSXWDWLRQLQ IXWXUH
EDUJDLQLQJ VLWXDWLRQV´48
Active involvement with international
organizations increases the prospects for compliance by raising reputation
costs for reneging,49 and pressure from the international community
threatens reputational injury to states that circumvent ICJ judgments. 50 For
H[DPSOH DOWKRXJK /LE\D LQLWLDOO\ UHMHFWHG WKH &RXUW¶V MXGJPHQW LQ LWV
territorial dispute with Chad, it eventually negotiated with Chad to reach an
agreement for implementation.51 /LE\D¶V RSHQ VXSSRUW RI WKH &RXUW¶V
GHFLVLRQ DQG DFFRUG ZLWK LPSOHPHQWLQJ LW ³JUHDWO\ EHQHILW>HG@ /LE\D¶V
LQWHUQDWLRQDO LPDJH DQG VWUHQJWKHQHG /LE\D¶V WLHV WR RWKHU 1RUWK $IULFDQ
FRXQWULHV´52
Cases like the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras further
H[HPSOLI\ VWDWHV¶ FRJQL]DQFH RI WKHLU SHUFHSWLRQ ZLWKLQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO
regime. Honduran allegations of Salvadoran misconduct and continuing
ERUGHU SUREOHPV KDYH VXJJHVWHG WKDW (O 6DOYDGRU LV QRW ³FRPSOHWHO\
fulfilling its obligation to execute the judgment reasonably and in good
IDLWK´53 Notwithstanding that allegation, however, El Salvador has
continued to publicly avow its acceptance of and compliance with the
&RXUW¶VMXGJPHQW7KXVHYHQLI(O6DOYDGRUKDGQRWHQGHDYRUHGto comply
with the judgment initially, reputation costs associated with noncompliance
provoked the state to at least portray compliance to the international
                                                                                                                      
Id. at 271.
Id.
Mitchell & Hensel, supra note 25, at 725.
49
Beth A. Simmons & Daniel J. Hopkins, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment ansd
Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. R. 819, 828 (2000).
50
Llamzon, supra note 2, at 832.
51
Letter dated 13 Apr. 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/432, (13 Apr. 1994).
52
Libya Prepared to Withdraw from Aouzou Strip, JANA NEWS AGENCY (TRIPOLI), Mar. 10, 1994,
available at http://ww w.ibru.dur.ac.uk.
53
Llamzon, supra note 2, at 828.
46
47
48
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community  a representation that in fact has effectuated compliance with
WKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQWRD considerable extent,54 even if inadvertently.
The influence of reputation can also be seen in more recent
disputes, like that between Bosnia and Serbia regarding the prevention and
punishment of the crime of genocide.55 The Court found that Serbia had
failed to prevent genocide and had flouted its obligations under the
genocide convention by failing to punish the perpetrators.56 The Court
ordered Serbia to take immediate steps to detain wartime leader Radovan
Karadzic and military commander Ratko Mladic for transfer to the United
1DWLRQV¶ ZDU FULPHV WULEXQDO IRU WULDO57 The European Union announced
WKDW 6HUELD¶V DGPLVVLRQ ZRXOG EH ZLWKKHOG XQWLO WKHVH WZR SHUSHWUDWRUV
were detained, amplifying the reputational risks at stake for
noncompliance.58 As ordered, Karadzic was arrested in Belgrade in July
2008.59 Although Mladic had not been arrested as of October 22, 2010,
Belgrade avowed commitment to arresting him in accordance with the
judgment.60 That commitment was honored in May 2011, when Serbian
war-crimes officials captured Mladic and delivered him to The Hague to
stand trial.61 The European Council formally made Serbia a candidate for
membership in the European Union on March 1, 2012,62 following
3UHVLGHQW +HUPDQ 9DQ 5RPSX\¶V DQQRXQFHPHQW WKDW WKH *HQHUDO $ffairs
&RXQFLO KDG ³H[DPLQHG DQG FRQILUPHG 6HUELD¶V SURJUHVV´ DQG
recommended that Serbia be granted candidate status.63
The recently adjudicated dispute between Malaysia and Singapore
over sovereignty of Pedra Branca64 shows how reputation costs promote
compliance, even where the decision is viewed as unfavorable to one or
both sides. It further exemplifies the clout of political pressure to instill
deference beyond mere ICJ judgments, but also for the ICJ procedure. The
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TIMES, Oct. 22, 2010, at A1.
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Profile: Ratko Mladic, BBC NEWS (Jul. 31, 2008), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1423551.stm.
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Court ruled that Pedra Branca is unGHU6LQJDSRUH¶VVRYHUHLJQW\$OWKRXJK
ERWK 0DOD\VLD DQG 6LQJDSRUH DJUHHG WR UHVSHFW DQG DFFHSW WKH &RXUW¶V
decision, the Malaysian Foreign Minister later said that his country had
renewed its search for documents that it asserts would allow it autonomy
over Pedra Branca.65 In making the assertion, the Foreign Minister cited to
a rule of the ICJ which allows for a case to be reviewed if new evidence is
ascertained within ten years of the judgment.66 This demonstrates the
reverence that states have, not only for the judgments the Court hands
down, but also for the modus operandi that the ICJ employs.
Proactive consideration of reputational effects as a factor in
compliance is not limited to concern for international reputation costs
alone. Following IndonesiD¶V DFFHSWDQFH RI WKH &RXUW¶V MXGJPHQW LQ WKH
Sipadan-Ligitan case, for example, the Indonesian Embassy expressed hope
that its positive reception to the decision would set a precedent in the
Southeast Asian region and serve as an example for future interactions
among countries in the region.67 ,QGRQHVLD¶V FRPSOLDQFH FDQ WKXV EH
attributed in part to the recognition of the effect that noncompliance could
have in future bargaining situations, not only on itself, but on the region as
a whole. Indonesia set a standard for compliance that raised, if not
established, the reputation costs of noncompliance in the adjudication and
resolution of future disputes by and between Southeast Asian countries.
Factors of external political influence are, more often than not,
intertwined. For example, reconsider the previously discussed maritime
boundary dispute between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. Following the
award, Senegal demanded compliance by Guinea-Bissau, but was impeded
by Guinea-%LVVDX¶V FRQWHQWLRQ WKDW WKH DZDUG Zas unenforceable on
substantive and procedural grounds.68 Despite Guinea-%LVVDX¶VREMHFWLRQV
however, obligatory pressure derived from the international community and
the ubiquity of international organizations heightened the reputation costs
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associated with noncompliance and prompted Guinea-Bissau to initiate
further proceedings with the Court, rather than disregard the judgment.69

B.

3DUWLHV¶1HHGIRUD'HILQLWLYH6ROXWLRQ

$ VHFRQG IDFWRU DWWULEXWDEOH WR VWDWHV¶ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK ,&-
decisions is partieV¶ VXEMHFWLYH QHHG WR DWWDLQ D GHILQLWLYH VROXWLRQ  7KH
elements between states that most readily create a need to solve a dispute
are shared interests in resolution, close relations, and military conflicts.
States are more likely to seek resolution through the ICJ and abide by the
&RXUW¶V MXGJPHQWV if they have a shared policy interest in resolving the
dispute or engage in close political or economic relations, or if there are
existing or anticipated military conflicts.
Judgments under such
circumstances have not been met with defiance in the modern era.
1.

Shared Interest

In each of the internationally adjudicated disputes in the modern
era in which a judgment has been reached, the parties have had some
VKDUHG LQWHUHVW LQ VHWWOHPHQW  7KH SDUWLHV¶ VKared interest often goes
beyond a mere mutual interest in resolution. Rather, there exists some
mutually collective concern that would benefit from, be addressed by, or be
improved upon by dispute settlement.
A judgment therefore
accommodates both parties with respect to that mutual interest, even if the
decision is more favorable to one party than the other.
In the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case,70 for example, the need to
resolve the issue of sovereignty over the territory was expedited by
Botswana and NamiELD¶VVKDUHGLQWHUHVWLQSUHYHQWLQJSRDFKLQJLQWKHDUHD
 an effort that had been complicated by the dispute.71 Likewise in the
*DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros Project case, the bi-national venture at issue
involved a joint investment by Hungary and Slovakia for the shared
purpose of developing energy and navigation and protecting against
floods.72 Another illustrative example is the dispute between Malaysia and
Indonesia over the Spidan and Ligitan islands, which are home to
ecosystems that contain more than 3,000 species of fish and hundreds of
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VSHFLHV RI FRUDO DQG ZKLFK UHSUHVHQW WKH ³FHQWUH RI RQH RI WKH ULFKHVW
PDULQH KDELWDWV LQ WKH ZRUOG´73 Such ecosystems require administrative
actions for their preservation, like the issuance of protective ordinances,
which require that sovereignty be established in one state.74
Parties may also have a mutually shared interest in preventing a
harmful rift in their relations. The case between Argentina and Uruguay
regarding the construction of pulp mills on the Uruguay River75 sought to
settle an economic and public relations rift between those states with
tourism and transportation industries that were affected.76 In the territorial
dispute between Libya and Chad, the states had shared economic and
political interests in avoiding a direct confrontation, as Chad could have
lost its economic help from Libya by publicizing Libyan adventurism in the
region.77
Mutually shared resources also expedite the need for settlement.
The dispute over sovereignty in the area between Greenland and Jan
Mayen, for example, stemmed from a common interest in obtaining and
protecting marine resources relied upon by the populations of Denmark78
and Norway.79 This impelled both states to delimitate the continental shelf
and fishery zones so that the shared resources could be properly conserved
and allocated. Similarly in the Pedra Branca case, Malaysia and Singapore
had a shared economic interest in fishing and shipping in the contested
territory.80 Likewise in the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain, shared
economic interests in petroleum, gas resources, and tourism in the area
incited the need for a definitive solution.81
2.
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Where a close relationship exists, whether based on economics,
cultural ties, history, or amiability, states are more likely to submit
themselves to the ICJ and observe any judgment it devises. For example,
during the proceedings over the Kasikili/Sedudu Island, Namibia and
Botswana each stressed their commitments to good relations with one
other.82 Because of those good relations, both states were interested in a
UDSLGVHWWOHPHQWRIWKHGLVSXWHDQGLQUHPRYLQJWKHFRQIOLFWDV³DQLUULWDQW
RI WKHLU UHODWLRQV´83 Likewise in the Sipadan-Ligitan dispute, bilateral
relations between Indonesia and Malaysia prompted the two states to
commit to a peaceful dispute settlement.84 The Indonesian Embassy stated
that such a commitment, which was largely attributed to the prompt and
HIIHFWLYH UHVROXWLRQ RI WKH GLVSXWH ³UHIOHFW>HG@ WKH PDWXULW\ LQ WKH
interaction between the two States´ DQG ³FRXOG RQO\ EH PDGH SRVVLEOH
ZLWKLQDFRQGXFLYHSROLWLFDOHQYLURQPHQWERWKELODWHUDOO\DQGUHJLRQDOO\´85
A similar interest existed more recently in the Pulp Mills on the Uruguay
River case, where the economic and public relations rift caused by the
dispute tainted otherwise amicable relations between Argentina and
Uruguay.86 Prior to the dispute, the parties shared many historical and
cultural ties, and both states sought a quick resolution of the issue in order
to prevent an unprecedented feud.87
This theme is consistent in cases in the modern era, as well as preNicaragua. Good relations between disputing states encourage fast
resolution and compliance, especially when those relations involve trade,
industry, or some other fiscal endeavor. It does not follow, however, that
conflicting relations between countries promote noncompliance. In the
case of the boundary issue between Qatar and Bahrain,88 for instance, the
boundary dispute had soured the relations between the countries for
decades.89 RathHU WKDQ SURPRWLQJ QRQFRPSOLDQFH WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ
offered a solution to the rift, ushered in a new era of cooperation between
the two states, and strengthened ties throughout the region.90
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Militarized Conflict

Fears of noncompliance often arise in disputes where military
clashes are present. In spite of what seems to be substantial grounds for
concern, such fears are unfounded.91 Instead, armed clashes tend to induce
the submission of international disputes to the arbitration of the ICJ,92 and
furthermore, the judgments rendered often foster cooperation and
friendship between previously feuding states. This was seen in the dispute
between Qatar and Bahrain, in which the Court settled a centuries-old
dispute between the countries that had been descriEHGDVRQHRI³WKHPRVW
H[SORVLYHGLVSXWHVLQWKH3HUVLDQ*XOI´93
In the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras over their land
frontier, the legal status of maritime spaces, and sovereignty over certain
islands, problems in implementation were foreseen from the outset due to
hostility and conflict between the countries.94 Each state, however,
instantaneously announced that it would accept the decision.95 Even as
DUPHG FRQIOLFWV SHUVLVWHG LQ WKH *XOI¶V ZDWHUV96 both states accepted the
&RXUW¶V MXGJPHQW and proceeded to eradicate hostilities and work to
implement the decision. Similarly, in the dispute between Libya and Chad,
fears that Libya would refuse to remove its military force were also
unfounded. Libya withdrew its troops from the area in question, in spite of
LWVLQLWLDO GLVDSSURYDO RI WKH &RXUW¶VMXGJPHQW97 The judgment has since
been recognized as an important factor in concluding the widespread
military activity that previously existed in the region.98
This trend has continued in recent cases. Maritime delimitation in
the Black Sea99 further exemplifies that even where conflict exists or is
anticipated, a judgment can not only end the possibility of conflict, but can
DOVR IRVWHU FRRSHUDWLRQ DQG SRVLWLYH UHODWLRQV  )ROORZLQJ WKH &RXUW¶V
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judgment regarding the disputed boundary, Ukrainian President Viktor
<XVFKHQNRVWDWHGWKDWKHFRQVLGHUHGWKHUXOLQJ³MXVWDQGILQDO´DQGKRSHG
³WKHUXOLQJRSHQ>HG@QHZRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUIXUWKHUIUXLWIXOFRRSHUDWLRQLQDOO
sectors of the bilateral cooperation bHWZHHQ8NUDLQHDQG5RPDQLD´100
As these examples illustrate, modern era cases suggest that the
presence of military conflict between parties to a dispute poses no threat to
compliance, but rather provides for it. Additionally, even in situations
where militarized conflict is neither present nor anticipated, a desire to
maintain peace and prevent any such conflict from arising can be a factor
of effective dispute resolution. Following the Sipadan-Ligitan case, for
example, Indonesia expressed relief that WKH VWDWHV KDG ³DYRLGHG WKH
possibility of an armed conflict and the potential losses resulting from
LW´101 ,QGRQHVLDQRIILFLDOVIXUWKHUFRPPHQWHGWKDWWKHSDUWLHV¶UHVROXWLRQRI
WKH GLVSXWH ZDV ³D YDOXDEOH LQYHVWPHQW LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI D SHDFHIXO
and prRVSHURXVUHJLRQ´102 The threat of armed conflict can thus serve as a
motive for compliance, even between countries with a historically amicable
relationship.

C.

Substance of the Judgment

The third factor affecting compliance, and one of the most
significant in achieving it, is the substance of the judgment itself. Elements
of the judgment that most readily effect compliance are the determinacy of
the decision, the presence of compromise and cooperation, and whether the
decision is in conflict with the self-interest of one or more of the parties. In
PRGHUQHUDFDVHVDPELJXRXVMXGJPHQWVRUWKRVHLQGLVFRUGZLWKDVWDWH¶V
self-interest cultivate the most problems for implementation, but states
comply with such decisions nonetheless. On the other hand, judgments that
entail compromise or allow for cooperative efforts are generally
implemented with ease.
1.

Determinacy of Decision

In the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, the slight
noncompliance was largely attributable to the uncertainty left by the
&RXUW¶VMXGJPHQW103 The jurisdictional boundary mandated by the ICJ was
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confused for some time, with both Nicaragua and El Salvador appearing to
misinterpret the point at the mouth of the gulf where Honduran waters
ended.104 In considering such obstacles to implementation, especially in
cases deemed as encountering noncompliance, it is important to note that
delays which are not attributable to bad faith on either side do not
constitute noncompliance in a strict sense. In the preceding case, for
example, failure to implement the special agreement and demarcate the
boundary appears to be more a problem of allocation of resources and
practical issues, than of bad faith or resistance by either party.105
Another case that is illustrative of ambiguity acting as a barrier to
FRPSOLDQFH LV WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ WKH *DEFLNRYR-Nagymaros Project
case.106 In its judgment, the Court refrained from making any specific
orders and instead imposed a duty on Hungary and Slovakia to negotiate
WKH ³PRGDOLWLHV´ RI LPSOHPHQWLng the judgment in good faith.107 The
DPELJXRXVRUGHU³GLGOLWWOHWRUHVROYHWKHXQGHUO\LQJGLVSXWHDQGDUJXDEO\
OHIWWKHSDUWLHVLQWKHVDPHSRVLWLRQWKH\ZHUHLQEHIRUHWKHFDVH´108 Prior
to the case, the issue of sovereignty between Indonesia and Malaysia could
not be overcome because of inconsistent written legal conventions and state
practices handed down from the British and Dutch colonial authorities in
1891.109 Thus, the inability to resolve the dispute was not caused by a
failure to negotiate or cooperate, but rather by the existence of a legal
doctrine which was open to various interpretations.110
These circumstances are indicative of the problems that confront
disputing parties following an ambiguous judgment. The states are often
unable to use the judgment to resolve their differences,111 not because they
refuse to comply, but because of a lack of direction on how to do so. As
such, assessing compliance in accord with judgments is especially
difficult.112 It does not follow, however, that the presence of the aforesaid
issues in implementation are signs of direct noncompliance. Rather, such
instances stand for the proposition that determinant decisions cultivate
compliance, whereas ambiguous decisions act as an obstacle to it.
While it is possible to procure compliance with a judgment in spite
of ambiguity, discontent with this approach has been noted. To settle the
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dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras over demarcation in the
Caribbean Sea, the Court ordered the states to negotiate the course of the
line between the existing endpoint of the land boundary in the mouth of the
Coco River and the starting point determined in the judgment in good
faith.113 $OWKRXJK FRPSOLDQFH KDV EHHQ DFKLHYHG WR GDWH WKH &RXUW¶V
GHFLVLRQ WR UHTXLUH ³JRRG IDLWK´ QHJRWLDWLRQs,114 rather than ruling on the
course itself, has met criticism.115
2.

Conflicting Self-Interest Principles

As expected, another challenge to compliance occurs when a
judgment is in direct conflict with the self-interest of one or more of the
parties involved. Although unfavorable decisions may spur noncompliance
initially, the modern era of cases has shown significant state deference to
the role of the ICJ as an arbitrator in the settlement of international
disputes. The following cases support the premise that states will comply
with judgments even when they are contrary to their national interests.116
Recall the Bakassi Peninsula dispute between Cameroon and
Nigeria. The Lake Chad basin contains significant resources,117 and the
Bakassi Peninsula has been an even greater source of tension because of its
vast oil resources.118 In its judgment, the Court awarded Cameroon the
Lake Chad boundary, 30 villages, and the Bakassi Peninsula.119 The order
ZDVLQFRQWHVWDEO\LQFRQIOLFWZLWK1LJHULD¶VVHOI-interest principles, and, not
surprisingly, Nigeria issued an official statement following the decision
UHMHFWLQJ SDUWV RI WKH MXGJPHQW DV ³XQDFFHSWDEOH´120 Both parties
acknowledged the substantial economic benefits available to the prevailing
party, and the intensity of those benefits required considerably more
assistance for compliance. Although coming to an agreement was more
RQHURXV D ³FRPSUHKHQVLYH UHVROXWLRQ RI WKH GLVSXWH´121 that relied on the
&RXUW¶V GHPDUFDWLRQ ZDV QRQHWKHOHVV UHDFKHG WKURXJK H[WHQVLYH
                                                                                                                      
113

Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v.
Hond.) 2007 I.C.J. 659, ¶ 321(4) (Oct. 8).
114
Id.
115
Yuschenko: UN International Court Of Justice's Decision On Deli mitation Of Black Sea Shelf
Between Ukraine And Romania Just, supra note 100.
116
SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 273.
117
International Court Poised to Rule on Nigeria-Ca meroon Border Dispute , AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Doc. FBIS-AFR-2002-1009 (Oct. 9, 2002).
118
Nigeria Hands Bakassi to Ca meroon, BBC NEWS REPORT (Aug. 14, 2006), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4789647.stm.
119
Ca meroon: Bakassi: Why the ICJ Judgment is Unacceptable ² Government, AFRICA NEWS SERVICE
(Oct. 24, 2002), available in Lexis, News Library, Allnews file.
120
Id.
121
See Ca meroon Nigeria S ign Agreement Ending Decades-Old Border Dispute , UN Press Release
AFR/1397 (June 12, 2006).

  

No. 1

Why Comply?

75

negotiations by a Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission established by the
United Nations. ,QWKH³IRUZDUG-ORRNLQJVSLULWRIJRRGZLOO>@´122 eventual
compliance was achieved and the Bakassi Peninsula was peaceably
WUDQVIHUUHG WR &DPHURRQ GHVSLWH 1LJHULD¶V FOHDU VHOI-interest in retaining
WKH ODQG¶V UHVRXUFHV123 United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
RIIHUHGSUDLVHRQWKHGDWHRIWUDQVIHUVWDWLQJWKDW³>W@KHFDVHKDVSURYHQ
the viability of a peaceful and legal settlement of border disputes, when it is
done with the full support of the international community and in a spirit of
PXWXDOUHVSHFWJRRGQHLJKERXUOLQHVVDQGFRRSHUDWLRQ´124
7KH &RXUW¶V DZDUGV RI VRYHUHLJQW\ LQ WKH .DVLNLOL6HGXGX ,VODQG
case and the Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan Islands case also created a
significant conflict to the self-interest of one of the disputing parties.125 In
each case, both states had an economic interest in developing tourism
infrastructure in the disputed area, and neither country could proceed until
sovereignty had been decided.126 ,Q WKH &RXUW¶V MXGJPHQWV VRYHUHLJQW\
over the Kasikili/Sedudu Island was awarded entirely to Botswana, and
sovereignty over the Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan Islands was awarded
to Indonesia. Although the awards clearly diverged from Namibia and
0DOD\VLD¶V LQWHUHVWV LQ WKH LVODQGV ERWK VWDWHV QRQHWKHOHVV FRPSOLHG ZLWK
WKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ
Another example is the recent case between Romania and
Ukraine,127 in which Romania was awarded a piece of land that contained
considerable natural gas and petrol depositories and was significantly larger
and more rich in resources than an adjacent piece of terrain awarded to
Ukraine.128 $FFRUGLQJWR9RORG\P\U9DV\OHQNR8NUDLQH¶VFRPPLVVLRQHU
in the United Nations International Court, nearly all of the available oil and
gas reserves were concentrated in the part of the sea shelf granted to
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Romania.129 Nonetheless, the line drawn was considered equitable between
both parties and both have thus far complied.130
The tendency of compliance in instances where judgments favor
RQHVWDWH¶VVHOI-LQWHUHVWRYHUDQRWKHU¶VKRZHYHULVQRWOHIWWRJRRGPDQQHUV
alone. As discussed in the following section, cooperation is the primary
means by which such decisions are eventually implemented.
3.

Compromise and Cooperation

Decisions that represent a compromise between the wants of both
states are more eagerly and easily complied with. In the boundary dispute
between Qatar and Bahrain, for example, the countries had a shared
economic interest in resolving the maritime and territorial issues. The
&RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ IRXQG D VROXWLRQ WR WKH ORQJ-standing dispute that
DPSOLILHGERWKFRXQWULHV¶ILVFDORSSRUWXQLWLHV131 The boundary defined by
the Court over the disputed territories was a compromise, and each party
considered itself a winner as a result.132 This ensured compliance, despite
the existence of centuries-old feuds between the states.133 Similarly, in the
boundary dispute between Romania and the Ukraine,134 WKH &RXUW¶V
judgment allocated a larger portion of the disputed area to Romania, but it
divided the marine area of the Black Sea along a line that was between the
claims of each country and was therefore seen as equitable and
acceptable.135
In some instances, a mutual interest between the parties may foster
cooperation without an explicit Court order. Recall Malaysia and
6LQJDSRUH¶V VKDUHG LQWHUHVW LQ ILVKLQJ DQG VKLSSLQJ LQ WKH GLVSXWH RYHU
Pedra Branca. The states agreed to establish a technical sub-committee to
oversee the conduct of joint survey works to prepare the way for talks on
maritime issues in and around the area. The states also agreed that if any
incident occurred in and around the waters of Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks
and South Ledge, either side would provide humanitarian assistance to the
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vessels involved.136 The result of this cooperative effort was a solution that
was advantageous to both states, allowing both Malaysian and Singaporean
fishermen to continue traditional fishing activities in those waters.137
States frequently engage in cooperative efforts through their own
initiatives as a means of implementing a decision of the Court. In the case
of whether an arbitral award on the maritime boundaries of Guinea-Bissau
and Senegal was binding,138 both states expressed a new willingness to
search for a comprehensive VROXWLRQ WR WKH GLVSXWH IROORZLQJ WKH &RXUW¶V
judgment.139 After engaging in new negotiations premised by a desire for
cooperation, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal concluded a management and
cooperation agreement that provided for joint exploration of a specifically
delimited maritime zone,140 resulting in an equitable compromise that was
suitable to both parties.141 Consider also the case concerning the maritime
delimitation of the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen,142 where
Denmark and Norway negotiated their own delimitation coordinates and
formally agreed on them, rather than implementing the delimitation
coordinates indicated by the Court.143 Further, the agreement reached postjudgment regulated a sovereignty issue that was not touched on at all by the
&RXUW¶VGecision.144
The trend in pursuing negotiations as a means to achieve
FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKH &RXUW¶V RUGHUV KDV FRQWLQXHG LQ FDVHV DV UHFHQWO\ DV
the Pulp Mills dispute. Although the judgment was only recently handed
down,145 Argentina and Uruguay have engaged in extensive negotiations in
RUGHUWRHIIHFWXDWHFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKH&RXUW¶VMXGJPHQWZKLFKKDVOHGWR
substantial observance to date.146
Post-judgment implementation discussions are not only common,
but may be dictated by the judgment itself, as in the recent case regarding
the territorial and maritime dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the
                                                                                                                      

Hussain, supra note 80.
Id.
138
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12).
139
SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 227.
140
Management and Cooperation Agreement, Senegal-Guinea-Bissau, 14 October 1993, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/120001_144071/18/6/00014934.pdf.
141
MAURICE KAMTO, Le contentieux de la frontier mariti me entre la Guinee-Bissau et le Senegal , 101
RGDIP (1997), translated in SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 358-74.
142
Maritime delimitation in the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), 1993
I.C.J. 38 (June 14).
143
SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 325-47.
144
Id. at 223 (the exploitation of possible transboundary oil and gas fields).
145
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment (Apr. 20, 2010).
146
Panos Merkouris, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay): Of
(QYLURQPHQWDO,PSDFW$VVHVVPHQWVDQG³3KDQWRP([SHUWV´, THE HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL (July 15,
2010), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/11/878.html.
136
137

  

78

CHI.-KENT J. INT¶L & COMP. L.

Vol. XII

Caribbean Sea.147 The Court drew the boundary line and ordered the
countries to negotiate in good faith the course of the line between the
existing endpoint of the land boundary in the mouth of the Coco River and
the starting point determined in the judgment.148 To date, negotiations have
allowed the states to agree on the course.149 As previously discussed,
however, such an open-ended assignment can be troublesome. Recall, for
H[DPSOH WKH *DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros Project case. The parties began
implementation discussions immediately following the 1997 judgment,150
but negotiations broke down when Slovakia asserted that Hungary was not
negotiating in good faith.151
As these cases demonstrate, a solution that encompasses a
compromise between the interests of both parties tends to be obeyed.
Whether the compromise is Court issued or agreed upon through prior or
subsequent cooperation of the parties is irrelevant. States are always free to
modify their rights through agreements, whether confirmed by adjudication
RU QRW DQG WKH FRQWHQW RI FRPSOLDQFH LV ³ILUVW RI DOO GHWHUPLQHG E\ WKH
SDUWLHV WKHPVHOYHV´152 In response to the subsequent agreement reached
between Libya and Chad regarding the Aouzou Strip, ICJ President
0RKDPPHG %HGMDRXO RIIHUHG DFFRODGHV WR WKH SDUWLHV IRU ³VSDU>LQJ@ QR
HIIRUWWRLPSOHPHQWWKH&RXUW¶V-XGJPHQWZLWKRXWGHOD\DQGLQDVSLULWRI
IULHQGO\ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ´153 Thus, one cannot speak of noncompliance in
cases where the parties jointly modify their legal relations following a
judgment and thereby change a regime adjudicated upon by the Court.
Compromise and cooperation attained at any stage in the dispute resolution
process serves as a sufficient, and significant indicator of compliance.
As discussed in the preceding section, there are some disputes in
ZKLFK WKH SDUWLHV¶ VHOI-interests are clearly in conflict. Cooperation is a
vital factor in ensuring compliance under such circumstances. Consider
/LE\D¶V LQLWLDO UHMHFWLRQ RI WKH &RXUW¶V MXGJPHQW UHJDUGLQJ WKH $RX]RX
Strip, in which the entire area was awarded to Chad. Parties did not reach
an agreement until subsequent negotiations occurred, after which Libya
LQGLFDWHG WKDW LW ZRXOG DFFHSW WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLsion and the countries
notified the United Nations that they had reached an agreement on
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implementation.154 As noted in the foregoing description of the case, a
compromise with regard to the autonomy of the disputed land was not
reached. Nonetheless, Libya accepted the judgment. Such acceptance
relates back to the first factor discussed herein: when all else fails, political
pressure will force a state to succumb to a judgment of the Court, even
when doing so is less than advantageous.

D.

Internal Political Influence

Internal pressure for a country to defy a judgment is present in
GLVSXWHV ZKHUH D MXGJPHQW FRQIOLFWV ZLWK VRPH DVSHFW RI WKH VWDWH¶V
political regime. Whether such internal pressure will arise and impede
successful implementation depends on the merits of the decision.
1.

Political Regime as an Excuse for Noncompliance

,Q UHVSRQVH WR WKH &RXUW¶V MXGJPHQW LQ WKH ODQG DQG PDULWLPH
boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria, Nigeria pled its
&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶VSULQFLSOHVRIIHGHUDOLVPDVDUHDVon for noncompliance with
SDUWVRIWKHMXGJPHQWWKDWLWIRXQGXQDFFHSWDEOHQDPHO\WKH&RXUW¶VDZDUG
of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon.155 Nigeria argued that its
Constitution specified the area as territory of the nation of Nigeria and, as
such, the federal government could not give up Bakassi until the requisite
national and state assemblies amended the Constitution.156 This assertion
was deemed moot based on the advanced agreement made by both
countries to respect any decision ordained by the ICJ.157
%\ FRQWUDVW WZR UHFHQW FDVHV LQYROYLQJ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶
application of the Vienna Convention challenged the political regime of the
United States and ultimately seemed to circumvent the trend toward
compliance. In 2001, the United States executed two German nationals
without first informing either of their right to communicate with German
consular officials. In response, the ICJ required the United States to give
Germany a general assurance that it would observe its obligations under the
Vienna Convention going forward and would review and reconsider future
convictions and sentences of German nationals sentenced to severe
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penalties.158 Despite having made Constitutional arguments against such
obligations, the United States addressed the ICJ decision by setting up
programs to promote understanding and observance of the Vienna
Convention.159 Further, the United States Department of State called for
³VWULFW FRPSOLDQFH E\ ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW RIILFLDOV´ DQG ³KDV H[WHQVLYHO\
coordinated with numerous federal agencies, as well as with states having
ODUJHIRUHLJQSRSXODWLRQV´160
The ICJ imposed a similar final judgment against the United States
three years later. In that case, the Court ordered the U.S. to reconsider the
sentences of Mexican nationals being held on death row.161 7KH &RXUW¶V
final judgment further stated that the ongoing program employed by the
United States to improve consular notification was adequate.162 The
disposition of the case appeared to set a new tone for U.S. compliance with
international obligations.163
However, the Bush administration
subsequently withdrew the United States from the Optional Protocol of the
Vienna Convention, on which the ICJ rulings were based.164 Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Jose Medellin, a
Mexican national who was sentenced to death in the state of Texas without
ever having been advised of his right to contact the Mexican consulate.165
The President then issued a memorandum to the Attorney General ordering
WKDW ³WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV    GLVFKDUJH LWV LQWHUQDWLRQDO REOLJDWLRQV´166 by
granting review to those foreign convicts who were not afforded consular
notice in accordance with the Vienna Convention.167 The Supreme Court
XOWLPDWHO\ UHYLHZHG 0HGHOOLQ¶V FDVH DQG IXUWKHU FRQIXVLQJ WKH 86
position, held that neither international treaty nor ICJ decisions are binding
domestic law, and that, absent an act of Congress or Constitutional
authority, the President of the United States lacks the power to enforce such
treaties or decisions.168
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The Supreme CRXUW¶VKROGLQJLQ Medellin v. Texas appears, at first
glance, to render international obligations all but unenforceable in certain
political regimes, like that of the United States. However, the Supreme
Court stopped short of any per se rule regarding enforcement of
LQWHUQDWLRQDOWUHDWLHVDQGLQVWHDGVHHPHGWRLQYRNHD³UHWDLOOHYHOWUHDW\-byWUHDW\´ DSSURDFK169 Under this approach, treaties and judgments do not
KDYH DQ ³ automatic GRPHVWLF OHJDO HIIHFW´170 but may be nonetheless
enforceable. In fact, the 866XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQDSSHDUVWRFUHDWH
VRPHWKLQJ RI D ³ORRSKROH´ LQ ZKLFK &RQJUHVV FDQ SDVV D ODZ UHTXLULQJ
compliance with an international obligation,171 and perhaps goes so far as
VXJJHVWLQJWKDWLWGRVR6HYHUDOWLPHVWKHGHFLVLRQ³FDOOVDWWHntion to the
FRQVWUXFWLYHUROHRIIHGHUDOLPSOHPHQWLQJOHJLVODWLRQ´VHHPLQJWRVXJJHVW
that implementing such a law would be within U.S. Congressional
authority.172
It is too soon to tell what the ultimate effect of this holding will
have on United States¶ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK LQWHUQDWLRQDO REOLJDWLRQV EXW LW
certainly suggests that compliance is not only possible, but desired. The
ambiguity and suggested escape route for implementing compliance with
international obligations like La Grand and Avena offers a remedy for the
complex predicament in which a state aspires to comply but is bound by its
own political regime.
2.

A Look at the Merits: International v. Domestic

It is important to acknowledge that political regime and related
principles of sovereignty do not always result in compliance problems. As
seen in the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria, although political
regime and autonomy have been asserted as excuses for noncompliance
with judgments in the territorial or interpretive contexts, such claims are
JHQHUDOO\ PRRW VR ORQJ DV WKH VWDWH VXEPLWWHG LWVHOI WR WKH &RXUW¶V
jurisdiction.173 Threats to compliance resulting from political regime most
often appear in criminal matters, where a judgment issued by the ICJ is in
conflict with some procedural aVSHFW RI D SDUW\¶V GRPHVWLF MXVWLFH
system.174
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Internal pressure to defy international judgments arises in matters
RI FULPLQDO SURFHGXUHEHFDXVHWKHVWDWH¶VDXWRQRP\ LV GLUHFWO\ FKDOOHQJHG
by an order that requires or prohibits something that unequivocally
diverges from requirements of its own legal system. Whether a judgment
WKDWFRQIOLFWVZLWKDVWDWH¶VDXWRQRP\ZLOOEHPHWZLWKGHILDQFHGHSHQGVRQ
the extent to which the matter is an international affair. Modern era cases
suggest that whether a criminal procedure issue constitutes an international
matter depends on where the relevant conduct occurred domestically or on
foreign soil.
The dispute between Bosnia and Serbia addressed the prevention
and punishment of the crime of genocide.175 The judgment ordered Serbia
to arrest and try two of its citizens  an act that Serbia had not chosen to
take on its own volition, but which it proceeded with upon order of the
ICJ.176 Although the perpetrators were Serbian, the crimes for which their
arrest and trial were demanded took place outside of Serbia.177 Because the
crimes took place on foreign soil, and in light of the seriousness of the
allegations, the dispute was undoubtedly international. Similarly, in the
case between Belgium and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the
arrest warrant in dispute was issued by Belgium against a Foreign Minister
not domiciled in Belgium, for crimes committed outside of its territory,178
making its issuance clearly an international matter. These cases suggest
that judgments that concern primarily international affairs, as opposed to
domestic matters, can be adjudicated internationally without the threat of
noncompliance.
The disputes presented in Avena and LaGrand, on the other hand,
are not as explicitly international. In both cases, the final judgments
imposed by the ICJ required the United States to comply with procedural
obligations for prisoners being held in U.S. facilities after being convicted
in U.S. courts for crimes committed while on U.S. soil.179 The ICJ had
jurisdiction over these disputes, as evidenced and acknowledged by the
United States through its submission to the tribunal. Such judgments pose
a much greater threat to state autonomy, however, because they are far
more detached internationally than those judgments regarding the crime of
genocide or the punishment of individuals who committed crimes and are
domiciled on foreign soil. When a judgment presents such a direct
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FKDOOHQJHWR DQG LQWHUIHUHQFH ZLWK D VWDWH¶V GRPHVWLFOHJDOMXVWLFH V\VWHP
the risk of noncompliance will be greater.
I I I.

Assessment

The cases considered in this paper can be divided into four topical
categories: territorial disputes over sovereignty,180 territorial disputes over
a boundary line,181 criminal procedure issues,182 and disputes over
interpretation.183
The only interpretation case considered in this assessment  the
Arbitral Award judgment issued between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal 
resulted in compliance. That outcome was not problematic due to the
external political influences and cooperation implicated merely by
submitting the issue to the Court for resolution. The act of submitting the
case to the ICJ for interpretation following an order demonstrates
ZLOOLQJQHVV WR FRPSO\ DQG UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH DZDUG¶V OHJLWLPDF\  ,W DOVR
reveals an acknowledgement of the reputation costs associated with defying
the international community and its organizations. It is no surprise, then,
WKDW WKH ,&-¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH $UELWUDO $ZDUG ZDV DFFHSWHG DQG
observed by both parties. Because the submission of a prior award for
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQWRWKH,&-UHFRJQL]HVWKH&RXUW¶VOHJLWLPDF\DQGWKHQHHGIRU
deference to the international system, compliance in such cases, especially
where cooperative efforts between the parties have been made, will be
easily achieved.
Territorial dispute judgments issued for the purpose of establishing
a boundary line are followed so long as the boundary demarcated is not
ambiguous. An ambiguous decision may not affect the likelihood of
compliance where the judgment is issued for the purpose of establishing
sovereignty over a particular area and sufficient cooperative efforts take
place between the states. Likewise, where a sufficiently determinant
boundary line is established, cooperative efforts can act as a means for
successful enforcement.184 Cooperation as a means for effectuating an
ambiguous delimitation, however, is less practical. Whereas good faith
negotiations may act as a means to relieve ambiguities in a sovereignty
judgment,185 the problems for enforcement posed by ambiguity in
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delimitation orders are often not related to autonomy principles, but rather
to uncertainty and misunderstanding.186
Ambiguous boundaries or
instructions leave parties with little guidance as to how to proceed, which
acts as a barrier to compliance and to future negotiations, even when
proceeding in good faith.187
Parties comply with territorial dispute judgments establishing
sovereignty over a particular area when the judgment is not in direct
conflict with the self-interests of one or more of the parties.188 It does not
follow, however, that awards of sovereignty that directly conflict with a
SDUW\¶VVHOI-interest will always pose problems for compliance. Whether a
state will disobey an order depends primarily on the relationship of the
parties involved. In cases where the parties to the dispute have an amicable
relationship and engage in close relations, compliance is not threatened by
a conflict of self-interest.189 Alternatively, where there is a history of
hostility and militarized conflict between disputing parties, the party
disadvantaged by the award will be resistant to accept it.190 In each dispute
where compliance was achieved despite conflicts to self-interest, there
existed good relations and a shared mutual interest that served to be
benefited by resolution.191 A shared mutual interest did not have the same
effect in preventing defiance where relations were hostile.192 Conflicting
self-interest principles also do not appear to have an effect on compliance
with judgments establishing boundary lines.193 Parties comply with
delimitation decisions, so long as they are unambiguous, regardless of
whether they are conflicting in nature.
Internal pressure to defy a judgment emerges when an order
FRQIOLFWV ZLWK VRPH DVSHFW RI D VWDWH¶V SROLWLFal regime. Political regime
and autonomy may be asserted as an excuse for noncompliance with
judgments in the territorial or interpretive contexts, but such claims are
JHQHUDOO\PRRWZKHUHDVWDWHVXEPLWWHGLWVHOIWRWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ 194
                                                                                                                      

See, e.g., Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sep. 11).
See, e.g., id.; *DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
188
Compare, e.g., Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment (Apr. 20, 2010),
and Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/
Singapore) 2008 I.C.J. 12 (May 23), and Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea 2007 I.C.J. 659 (Oct. 8), with Cameroon v. Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303
(Oct. 10), Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3).
189
See, e.g., Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/ Malaysia), 2002 I.C.J. 625
Judgment (Dec. 17); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), (Dec. 13, 1999) Judgment.
190
See, e.g., Cameroon v. Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303; Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb.
3).
191
See, e.g., Indonesia/ Malaysia, 2002 I.C.J. 625; Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), (Dec. 13,
1999).
192
Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3).
193
See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Judgment (Feb. 3, 2009).
194
See Cameroon v. Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303.
186
187

  

Why Comply?

No. 1

85

Conflicts most often appear in criminal matters, where a judgment issued
E\ WKH &RXUW LV DW RGGV ZLWK VRPH SURFHGXUDO DVSHFW RI D SDUW\¶V MXVWLFH
system.195 :KHWKHU D MXGJPHQW ZKLFK FRQIOLFWV ZLWK D VWDWH¶V DXWRQRP\
will be met with defiance depends on the extent to which the matter is an
international affair. Modern era cases suggest that whether an issue is
sufficiently international depends on whether the relevant conduct occurred
domestically or on foreign soil. If a judgment is a primarily international
affair, as opposed to a domestic matter, it can be adjudicated internationally
without threat of defiance.
I V.

Continuing the trend toward compliance

As this paper demonstrates, the tendency of states in the modern
era is to comply with decisions handed down by the ICJ. The risk of
defiance arises predominantly in two instances. First, when a sovereignty
DZDUG WKDW GLUHFWO\ FRQIOLFWV ZLWK D SDUW\¶V VHOI-interest is issued under
hostile circumstances. 6HFRQG ZKHQ D MXGJPHQW FRQIOLFWV ZLWK D SDUW\¶V
domestic SROLWLFDO UHJLPH DQG ODFNV LQWHUQDWLRQDO WLHV EH\RQG D SDUW\¶V
citizenship status.

A.

External Political Influence as an Enforcer of International
Judgments

In the first instance, external political influences will compel an
initially defiant state to comply.
Pressure from the international
community and the presence of international organizations increase
reputation costs for defiant states and thus produce compliance, even where
DQDZDUGLVLQGLUHFWFRQIOLFWZLWKDSDUW\¶VVHOI-interest and where relations
between parties are hostile. As demonstrated herein, even in those
sovereignty disputes where a state was openly critical or publicly
disavowed a judgment, subsequent pressure from the international
community forced compliance.
Pressure from the international community raises the risk of
consequential penalties, both regionally and internationally, for disobedient
states, and leaves parties with few alternatives but to comply. The
substantial reputational risks associated with noncompliance force
dissatisfied parties to accept judgments, often turning to international
organizations as a means for negotiating measures to be taken to satisfy the
                                                                                                                      
See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 12 Judgment (Feb. 3); Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 42; LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 4 Judgment (June 27);
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. &
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11).
195
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&RXUW¶V MXGJPHQW DQG DFKLHYLQJ DV PXFK SURWHFWLRQ DV FDQ EH UHDVRQDEO\
expected for all parties to the dispute. Pressure from the international
community coupled with active efforts by international organizations thus
acts as an enforcement mechanism for international judgments by raising
the reputation costs of defiance and offering protection and mediation for
disputing parties.
These external political influences legitimize international decrees
and the power of the international regime. Each time a judgment is issued,
whether it is met with compliance or initial noncompliance, the presence of
external political influences work to further inaugurate and stabilize the
international system. As decisions continue to be implemented, whether
independently or in response to external pressure, the international law
regime gains authority. Continuing this trend over time will further
establish international law, sustain international order, and promote the
legitimacy of the international regime.

B.

Establishing International Boundaries

In the latter instance, where a judgment regarding a primarily
domestic matWHU LV LQ FRQIOLFW ZLWK D SDUW\¶V RZQ SROLWLFDO UHJLPH VWDWH
sovereignty and autonomy principles will pose problems for compliance.
The same risk of defiance does not occur, however, when the issue is
sufficiently international. This discrepancy exposes the principal quandary
plaguing the international law regime as a whole: the authority of a
peripheral body of law to control individually autonomous states.
In cases that are truly international ² for example, disputes
involving sovereignty over a particular area or the procedure to be followed
when engaging in relations that cross state lines ² judgments are met with
FRPSOLDQFH  'HVSLWH WKH LPSOLFDWLRQV VXFK FRPSOLDQFH KDV IRU D VWDWH¶V
sovereignty, the matter in dispute is international by its very nature and
cannot be settled by the will of one state without the consent or cooperation
of the other. It should be no surprise then, that states are willing to forfeit
some autonomy to an international tribunal in cases where the tribunal is
clearly better suited to arbitrate the dispute and implement a solution. It
should likewise be no surprise that a state will be less likely to forfeit its
autonomy to an international tribunal when the matter being adjudicated is
primarily domestic in nature ² for example, orders pertaining to domestic
acts that are to be carried out domestically and are in conflict with the
domestic system currently in place. External political influence may still
provide states with an incentive to comply in such cases and states may, in
fact, portray an appearance of compliance for that purpose. However, such
a representation will often be unauthentic, as the state is not truly willing to
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² or feels procedurally barred from ² surrendering its sovereignty to such
an extent.
Luckily, international judgments regarding primarily domestic
conduct are rare. Most disputes adjudicated by the ICJ are sufficiently
international to necessitate international arbitration. Where a matter seems
to be questionably domestic, the ICJ should be cautious in its adjudication
of the dispute. Impositions on conduct that is not sufficiently international
poses a direct conflict to state sovereignty and indirect problems for the
international regime as well. External political influences have done much
to police international conduct and establish a regime in which
international law and order are practical and accepted. The questionable
infringements on state sovereignty can act to deter that development by
bringing to the forefront the circumstances that pose the largest threat to
international authority and make states most apprehensive to submit to the
,&-¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ
The international law system is a regime based on the consent of
the sovereign, and states are willing to consent to that regime for a price.
That is, states are willing to forfeit some sovereignty to an international
system, even if not in their best interest, in return for the safeguard of an
international body to manage and protect international relations effectively.
That exchange is threatened, however, where an international body
LPSHGHV WRR IDU LQWR D VWDWH¶V GRPHVWLF UHODWLRQV DQG DWWHPSWV WR UHJXODWH
that which the state will not ² or, under its own legal precepts cannot ²
consent. In order to maintain the trend toward compliance and to continue
establishing the legitimacy of the international regime, the ICJ needs to
HVWDEOLVKERXQGDULHVWKDWFRQIRUPWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶VROGHVWSULQFLSOH
pacta sunt servanda .
Conclusion
Decisions of the International Court of Justice have been met with
substantial compliance in the modern era. Direct, defiant noncompliance,
where a state deliberately and ceaselessly rejects a decision of the Court
and refuses to implement its judgment, has not occurred in any case. In
cases where noncompliance has been present, the noncompliant behavior
has been fleeting or slight.
Pressure from the international community and the presence of
international organizations raise the reputation costs associated with
noncompliance, thereby minimizing the risk of disobedience with
judgments. Defiant noncompliance occurs where a judgment is in discord
ZLWK D VWDWH¶V VHOI-interest or threatens its autonomous regime. Problems
for implementation may also occur where judgments are ambiguous, but
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such complications are not a result of defiance.
Instances of
noncompliance can be cured if the subject matter is sufficiently
international and there is ample external political pressure, especially
where the presence of a mutually shared interest, a close relationship, or an
H[WDQW RU DQWLFLSDWHG PLOLWDU\ FRQIOLFW KDV LQFUHDVHG WKH VWDWH¶V QHHG IRU D
definitive solution. Judgments that entail compromise or allow for
cooperative efforts are more easily implemented, regardless of whether the
compromise is designated by WKH &RXUW¶V MXGJPHQW RU DOWHUQDWLYHO\ LV
achieved through subsequent cooperation between the parties.
In order to continue the trend toward compliance, international
organizations and the international community must continue to act as
enforcers of international decisions by exerting pressure on defiant parties
and raising reputation costs associated with noncompliance. Further, the
international law regime must remain a system of sovereign states
operating on a theory of consent in which a proper balance is achieved
between the sovereignty sacrificed and the international safeguards secured
as a result.
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A ppendix A
LIST OF CASES CONSIDERED
Year
Initiated:

Judgment
Date: (m-d-y)

2006

Claimants:

Subject:

Category:

04-20-2010

Argentina v. Uruguay

Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay

2004

02-03-2009

Romania v. Ukraine

Maritime Delimitation in
the Black Sea

Territorial
dispute
(sovereignty
issue)
Territorial
dispute
(boundary line)

2003

05-23-2008

Malaysia/ Singapore

Sovereignty over Pedra
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh,
Middle Rocks and South
Ledge

Territorial
dispute
(sovereignty
issue)

2003

03-31-2004

Mexico v. United
States of America

Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals

Criminal
procedure

2002

07-12-2005

Benin/Niger

Frontier Dispute

Territorial
dispute
(boundary line)

2000

02-14-2002

Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Belgium

Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000

Criminal
procedure

1999

10-08-2007

Nicaragua v. Honduras

Territorial and Maritime
Dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras
in the Caribbean Sea

1999

06-21-2007

Germany v. United
States of America

LaGrand

Territorial
dispute
(boundary line
and sovereignty
issue)
Criminal
procedure

1998

10-23-2001

Indonesia/ Malaysia

Sovereignty over Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau
Sipadan

Territorial
dispute
(sovereignty
issue)

1996

12-13-1999

Botswana/ Namibia

Kasikili/Sedudu Island

Territorial
dispute
(sovereignty
issue)

1994

06-11-1998

Cameroon v. Nigeria:
Equatorial Guinea
intervening

Land and Maritime
Boundary between
Cameroon and Nigeria

1993

09-25-1997

Hungary/Slovakia

*DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros

Territorial
dispute
(sovereignty
issue)
Territorial

x

x
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dispute
(boundary line)
Criminal
procedure

1993

07-11-1996

Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Serbia and
Montenegro

Application of the
Convention on the
Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide

1991

07-01-1994

Qatar v. Bahrain

Maritime Delimitation
and Territorial Questions

1990

02-03-1994

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/
Chad

Territorial Dispute

Territorial
dispute
(boundary line)
Territorial
dispute
(sovereignty
issue)

1989

11-12-1991

Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal

Arbitral Award of 31
July 1989

Interpretation
issue

1988

06-14-1993

Denmark v. Norway

Maritime Delimitation in
the Area between
Greenland and Jan
Mayen

Territorial
dispute
(boundary line)

1986

09-13-1992

El Salvador/ Honduras:
Nicaragua intervening

Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier
Dispute

Territorial
dispute
(boundary line)

  

Why Comply?

No. 1

91

A ppendix B
CASES EXCLUDED FROM CONSIDERATION
Year
Initiate
d:

Claimants:

Subject:

Reason for Exclusion:

2010

Burkina Faso/Niger

Frontier Dispute

Case is still pending

2010

Australia v. Japan

Whaling in the Antarctic

Case is still pending

2009

Belgium v.
Switzerland

Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial
Matters

Case is still pending

2009

Honduras v. Brazil

Certain questions
concerning diplomatic
relations

Case is still pending

2008

Germany v. Italy

Jurisdictional Immunities
of the State

Case is still pending

2008

Former Yugoslav
Republic of
Macedonia v. Greece

Application of the Interim
Accord of 13 September
1995

Case is still pending

2008

Georgia v. Russian
Federation

Application of the
International Convention
on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial
Discrimination

Case is still pending

2008

Ecuador v. Colombia

Aerial Herbicide Spraying

Case is still pending

2008

x

Peru v. Chile

Maritime Dispute

Case is still pending

2006

x

Commonwealth
of Dominica v.
Switzerland

Case is still pending

2006

x

Djibouti v.
France

Status vis-à-vis the Host
State of a Diplomatic
Envoy to the United
Nations
Certain Questions of
Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters

2005

x

Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua

Dispute regarding
Navigational and Related
Rights

There has not been
sufficient ti me to adjudge
compliance since Judgment
on July 13, 2009

2003

Republic of the
Congo v. France

Certain Criminal
Proceedings in France

Case is still pending

2002

Democratic Republic
of the Congo v.

Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo

Case was discontinued
without any prior judgment

Judgment is not one in
which compliance can be
evaluated
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on the merits

Rwanda
2002

2001

El
Salvador/Honduras:
Nicaragua
intervening (El
Salvador v.
Honduras)
Nicaragua v.
Colombia

Vol. XII

Application for Revision of
the Judgment of 11
September 1992 in the
Case concerning the Land,
Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute

Clai m was rejected on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction
or admissibility

Territorial and Maritime
Dispute

Judgment is not one in
which compliance can be
evaluated

2001

Bosnia and
Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia

Application for Revision of
the Judgment of 11 July
1996 in the Case
concerning Application of
the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide

Clai m was rejected on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction
or admissibility

2001

Liechtenstein v.
Germany

Certain Property

Clai m was rejected on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction
or admissibility

1999

Croatia v. Serbia

Application of the
Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide

Judgment has been made
regarding jurisdiction, but
no Judgment has been
made on the merits

1999

Yugoslavia v. United
States of America

Legality of Use of Force

Clai m was rejected on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction
or admissibility

1999

Yugoslavia v. Spain

Legality of Use of Force

Clai m was rejected on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction
or admissibility

1999

Serbia and
Montenegro v. United
Kingdom

Legality of Use of Force

Clai m was rejected on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction
or admissibility

1999

Serbia and
Montenegro v.
Portugal

Legality of Use of Force

Clai m was rejected on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction
or admissibility

1999

Serbia and
Montenegro v.
Netherlands

Legality of Use of Force

Clai m was rejected on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction
or admissibility

1999

Serbia and
Montenegro v. Italy

Legality of Use of Force

Clai m was rejected on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction
or admissibility

1999

Serbia and
Monténégro v.

Legality of Use of Force

Clai m was rejected on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction
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or admissibility

Germany
1999

1999

x

93

Serbia and
Montenegro v. France

Legality of Use of Force

Clai m was rejected on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction
or admissibility

Serbia and
Montenegro v.
Canada

Legality of Use of Force

Clai m was rejected on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction
or admissibility

x

1999

Pakistan v. India

Aerial Incident of 10
August 1999

Clai m was rejected on
the basis of lack of
jurisdiction or
admissibility

1999

Democratic
Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda

Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo

Case was discontinued
without any prior
judgment on the merits

1998

Republic of
Guinea v.
Democratic
Republic of the
Congo

Ahmadou Sadio Diallo

Compliance may not yet
be evaluated

1998

Cameroon v.
Nigeria

Request for
Interpretation of the
Judgment of 11 June
1998 in the Case
concerning the Land
and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroon and
Nigeria

Clai m was rejected on
the basis of lack of
jurisdiction or
admissibility

1995

Spain v. Canada

Fisheries Jurisdiction

Clai m was rejected on
the basis of lack of
jurisdiction or
admissibility
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1992

Islamic Republic
of Iran v. United
States of America

Oil Platforms

Clai m was rejected with
no positive statement
beyond that rejection
could possibly i mply a
duty of acceptance and
i mplementation (the
&RXUW¶VVWDWHPHQWGLG
not trigger an
obligation of
compliance because the
Court ulti mately did not
find a breach)

1992

Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v.
United States of
America

Questions of
Interpretation and
Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention
arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie

Case was removed from
the Court's list at the
joint request of the
parties

1992

Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v.
United Kingdom

Questions of
Interpretation and
Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention
arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie

Case was removed from
the Court's list at the
joint request of the
parties

1991

Portugal v.
Australia

East Timor

Clai m was rejected on
the basis of lack of
jurisdiction or
admissibility

1989

Nauru v. Australia

Certain Phosphate
Lands in Nauru

Case was discontinued
without any prior
judgment on the merits

1987

United States of
America v. Italy

Elettronica Sicula
S.p.A. (ELSI)

Clai m was rejected with
no positive statement
beyond that rejection
could possibly i mply a
duty of acceptance and
i mplementation (the
applicant lost on the
basis of substantive
law)

1986

Nicaragua v.
Honduras

Border and Transborder
Armed Actions

Case was discontinued
without any prior
judgment on the merits
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A ppendix C
COMPLIANCE BY CATEGORY
T able 1. Territorial Disputes (sovereignty)
Case:

Initial:

End:

Argentina v. Uruguay (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay)

Yes

Yes

Malaysia/ Singapore (Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu
Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge)

Yes

Yes

Indonesia/ Malaysia (Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau
Sipadan)

Yes

Yes

Botswana/ Namibia (Kasikili/Sedudu Island)

Yes

Yes

Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening (Land and
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria)

No

Yes

No

Yes

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ Chad (Territorial Dispute)

T able 2. Territorial Disputes (boundary line)
Case:

x
x

Initial:

End:

Romania v. Ukraine (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea)

Yes

Yes

Benin/Niger (Frontier Dispute)

Yes

Yes

Nicaragua v. Honduras (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea)

Yes

Yes

Yes *

Yes *

Qatar v. Bahrain (Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
between Qatar and Bahrain)

Yes

Yes

Denmark v. Norway (Maritime Delimitation in the Area between
Greenland and Jan Mayen)

Yes

Yes

El Salvador/ Honduras: Nicaragua intervening (Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier Dispute)

Yes *

Yes *

+XQJDU\6ORYDNLD *DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros Project)

*Compliance is difficult to ascertain as a result of ambiguity in the requirements of
the decision.

T able 3. Criminal Procedure Issues
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Case:

x
x
x
x

Vol. XII
Initial:

End:

Mexico v. United States of America (Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals)

Yes

No

Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium (Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000)
Germany v. United States of America (LaGrand)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro
(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide)

Yes

Yes

Initial:

End:

T able 4. Interpretation of Prior Award
Case:
Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal (Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989)

Yes

Yes
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A ppendix D
FIGURES

NEED FOR

SUBSTANCE

A
DEFINITIVE
SOLUTION

JUDGMENT

OF THE

Argentina v. Uruguay (Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay)

x

x
x
x

Mexico v. United States of America
(Avena and Other Mexican Nationals)

+

+

+

+

Benin/Niger (Frontier Dispute)

+

Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium (Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000)

+

Germany v. United States of America
(LaGrand)

x
Indonesia/ Malaysia (Sovereignty over Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan)

+
+

+

+

-

+

N
E
N
E

+

Compromise and Cooperation

Conflicting Self-Interests
N
E

+

Nicaragua v. Honduras (Territorial and
Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea)

x

Militarized Conflict

+

Romania v. Ukraine (Maritime
Delimitation in the Black Sea)
Malaysia/ Singapore (Sovereignty over
Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle
Rocks and South Ledge)

x

+

Close Relations

Reputation Costs

3UHVHQFHRI,QW¶O2UJDQL]DWLRQV

NE = NO EFFECT ON COMPLIANCE

3UHVVXUHIURP,QW¶O&RPPXQLW\

- = NEGATIVE EFFECT ON COMPLIANCE

INTERNAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE

+ = POSITIVE EFFECT ON COMPLIANCE

EXTERNAL
POLITICAL
INFLUENCE

Ambiguous Decision

KEY

Shared Mutual Interest

F igure 1. Influence of F actors by Case

+

+

+

+

+

N
E
+

+

N
E
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Botswana/ Namibia (Kasikili/Sedudu Island)

+

Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea
intervening (Land and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroon and Nigeria)

+

+

+XQJDU\6ORYDNLD *DEþtNRYR-Nagymaros
Project)

+

+

+

Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro (Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide)

+

+

+

+

+

Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal (Arbitral Award
of 31 July 1989)

+

+
+

+

N
E
-

+

Qatar v. Bahrain (Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial Questions)
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ Chad (Territorial
Dispute)

Vol. XII

+

N
E

+

+

+

+

+
-

+

+

El Salvador/ Honduras: Nicaragua
intervening (Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute)

+

+
+

+

Denmark v. Norway (Maritime Delimitation
in the Area between Greenland and Jan
Mayen)

-

+

+

-

F igure 2. Prevalence of F actors Effectuating Compliance
Pressure  from  Int'l
Community
Presence  of  IOs

8%

14%

Reputation  Costs

10%

Shared  Interests
15%

9%

Close  Relations
Militarized  Conflict

5%

15%

9%

12%
3%

Determinacy  of  Decision
Conflicting  Self-‐Interests
Principles
Compromise/Cooperatio
n

